On the other hand, given no such evidence, a U. The statements of U. In responding to a letter from Khrushchev, Kennedy said,. If the Soviets maintained their missiles, the United States preferred an air strike to the blockade. As Robert Kennedy, a close adviser to his brother during the crisis, said,. Finally, it is well known that several of President Kennedy's advisers felt very reluctant about initiating an attack against Cuba without exhausting less belligerent courses of action that might bring about the removal of the missiles with less risk and greater sensitivity to American ideals and values.
Pointedly, Robert Kennedy claimed that an immediate attack would be looked upon as "a Pearl Harbor in reverse, and it would blacken the name of the United States in the pages of history," which is again consistent with the Alternative since the United States ranks AW next worst 2 - a "dishonourable" U. If Alternative provides a more realistic representation of the participants' perceptions than Chicken does, standard game theory offers little help in explaining how the 3,3 compromise was achieved and rendered stable.
As in Chicken, the strategies associated with this outcome are not a Nash equilibrium, because the Soviets have an immediate incentive to move from 3,3 to 1,4. However, unlike Chicken, Alternative has no outcome at all that is a Nash equilibrium, except in "mixed strategies". These are strategies in which players randomize their choices, choosing each of their two so-called pure strategies with specified probabilities. But mixed strategies cannot be used to analyse Alternative, because to carry out such an analysis, there would need to be numerical payoffs assigned to each of the outcomes, not the rankings I have assumed.
The instability of outcomes in Alternative can most easily be seen by examining the cycle of preferences, indicated by the arrows going in a clockwise direction in this game. Following these arrows shows that this game is cyclic , with one player always having an immediate incentive to depart from every state: the Soviets from 3,3 to 1,4 ; the United States from 1,4 to 4,1 ; the Soviets from 4,1 to 2,2 ; and the United States from 2,2 to 3,3.
Again we have indeterminacy, but not because of multiple Nash equilibria, as in Chicken, but rather because there are no equilibria in pure strategies in Alternative. How, then, can we explain the choice of 3,3 in Alternative, or Chicken for that matter, given its nonequilibrium status according to standard game theory? It turns out that 3,3 is a "nonmyopic equilibrium" in both games, and uniquely so in Alternative, according to the theory of moves TOM. By postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but also to the consequences of countermoves to these moves, counter-countermoves, and so on, TOM extends the strategic analysis of conflict into the more distant future.
To be sure, game theory allows for this kind of thinking through the analysis of "game trees," where the sequential choices of players over time are described.
But the game tree continually changed with each development in the crisis. By contrast, what remained more or less constant was the configuration of payoffs of Alternative, though where the players were in the matrix changed. In effect, TOM, by describing the payoffs in a single game but allowing players to make successive calculations of moves to different positions within it, adds nonmyopic thinking to the economy of description offered by classical game theory.
The founders of game theory, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, defined a game to be "the totality of rules of play which describe it. The four rules of play of TOM describe the possible choices of the players at each stage of play:.
Note that the sequence of moves and countermoves is strictly alternating: first, say, the row player moves, then the column player, and so on, until one player stops, at which point the state reached is final and, therefore, the outcome of the game. I assume that no payoffs accrue to players from being in a state unless it becomes the outcome which could be the initial state if the players choose not to move from it. To assume otherwise would require that payoffs be numerical, rather than ordinal ranks, which players can accumulate as they pass through states.
But in many real-life games, payoffs cannot easily be quantified and summed across the states visited. Moreover, the big reward in many games depends overwhelmingly on the final state reached, not on how it was reached. In politics, for example, the payoff for most politicians is not in campaigning, which is arduous and costly, but in winning.
Rule l differs drastically from the corresponding rule of play in standard game theory, in which players simultaneously choose strategies in a matrix game that determines its outcome. Instead of starting with strategy choices, TOM assumes that players are already in some state at the start of play and receive payoffs from this state only if they stay. Based on these payoffs, they must decide, individually, whether or not to change this state in order to try to do better.
Of course, some decisions are made collectively by players, in which case it is reasonable to say that they choose strategies from scratch, either simultaneously or by coordinating their choices. But if, say, two countries are coordinating their choices, as when they agree to sign a treaty, the important strategic question is what individualistic calculations led them to this point. The formality of jointly signing the treaty is the culmination of their negotiations and does not reveal the move-countermove process that preceded the signing.
It is precisely these negotiations, and the calculations underlying them, that TOM is designed to uncover. To continue this example, the parties that sign the treaty were in some prior state from which both desired to move - or, perhaps, only one desired to move and the other could not prevent this move from happening rule 6. Eventually they may arrive at a new state, after, say, treaty negotiations, in which it is rational for both countries to sign the treaty that was previously negotiated.
As with a treaty signing, almost all outcomes of games that we observe have a history. TOM seeks to explain strategically the progression of temporary states that lead to a more permanent outcome. Consequently, play of a game starts in an initial state, at which players collect payoffs only if they remain in that state so that it becomes the final state, or outcome, of the game. If they do not remain, they still know what payoffs they would have collected had they stayed; hence, they can make a rational calculation of the advantages of staying or moving.
They move precisely because they calculate that they can do better by switching strategies, anticipating a better outcome when the move-countermove process finally comes to rest. The game is different, but not the configuration of payoffs, when play starts in a different state.
Rules l - 4 rules of play say nothing about what causes a game to end, only when: termination occurs when a "player whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy" rule 4.
But when is it rational not to continue moving, or not to move at all from the initial state? Rule 5 termination rule says when a player will not move from an initial state.
While condition i of this rule needs no defence, condition ii requires justification. It says that if it is rational, after P1 moves, for play of the game to cycle back to the initial state, P1 will not move in the first place. After all, what is the point of initiating the move-countermove process if play simply returns to "square one," given that the players receive no payoffs along the way to the outcome?
English and 3 more. Publisher: 1C Entertainment. Franchise: 1C. Share Embed. Add to Cart. Package info. View Community Hub. About This Game Cuban Missile Crisis is a real-time strategy game combined with a global turn-based tactical mode, thrusting gamers into a world ravaged by the military-political confrontation between the USA and USSR in Cuban Missile Crisis offers an alternative interpretation of the events that followed the infamous nuclear stand off between the United States and Cuba.
As the stalemate collapsed, the two superpowers unleashed their nuclear arsenal on the world, levelling its metropolitan expanses and leaving scorched radioactive deserts. The cities that managed to survive the disaster realised that the most precious resources were now clean earth and water.
The remaining world citizens found themselves in a war fighting for their very survival. Cuban Missile Crisis provides an interesting mix of real-time battles and a turn-based global strategy mode, forcing players to use tactical troop movements while managing resources and armies.
Conquer new resources, track new borders, create a new map of the world. New types of weapons and equipment including helicopters, rockets, reconnaissance troops, etc.
Radioactive contamination zones that have an influence upon military equipment and troops. See all. View all. Click here to see them. Customer reviews. Overall Reviews:. Recent Reviews:. Review Type. All Positive Negative Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.
The President decided upon a middle course. That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.
The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U. Meanwhile, U. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U. On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U.
The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate. That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day.
We are ready for this.
0コメント